A Comparative Analysis of the Origin and Structure of Public Health Financing for HIV Care in the United States and England by Keener, Steven R.
Notre Dame Law Review
Volume 83
Issue 3 Symposium: Stare Decisis and Nonjudicial
Actors
Article 9
September 2013
A Comparative Analysis of the Origin and
Structure of Public Health Financing for HIV Care
in the United States and England
Steven R. Keener
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Law Review by an
authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation
Steven R. Keener, A Comparative Analysis of the Origin and Structure of Public Health Financing for HIV Care in the United States and
England, 83 Notre Dame L. Rev. (2008).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr/vol83/iss3/9
NOTES
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE ORIGINS AND
STRUCTURE OF PUBLIC HEALTH FINANCING
FOR HIV CARE IN THE UNITED STATES
AND ENGLAND
Steven R Keener*
INTRODUcTION
The growing number of Americans without medical coverage has
elevated the possibility of universal health care in the public debate.
Presidential candidates vying for votes in 2008 are being pressed on
how they plan to cover the 46.5 million uninsured Americans.'
Michael Moore's documentary, Sicko,2 came out in June 2007 with
animated criticism of the American health care system. In typical
staged bewilderment, Moore walks the halls of an English National
Health Service (NHS) hospital, marveling that patients don't have to
pay for treatment.
American activists, critics, reformers, and even Presidents have
often looked across the Atlantic to the NHS as an example of what
universal coverage could look like. Since W'WII, England has used a
single-payer system, which means that the English government directly
pays for and coordinates medical services, providing comprehensive
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2008; B.A., Eastern
University, 2002.
1 KAISER COMM'N ON MEDICAID & THE UNINSURED, THE HENRYJ. KAISER FAMILY
FOUND., THE UNINSURED 1 (2007), available at http://kff.org/uninsured/upload/
7451-03.pdf. The number of uninsured Americans equals 18% of those under the age
of sixty-five. Id. The report's findings are based on the Census Bureau's 2006 March
Current Population Survey. Id. at 37.
2 SIcKo (Lionsgate 2007).
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care to all citizens and many legal aliens. 3 The American system, on
the other hand, is unique among industrialized nations in continuing
to rely on a system of private insurance and fee-for-service care.4 Pri-
marily through Medicaid and Medicare, the federal and state govern-
ments subsidize care for the extremely poor and the elderly. Unlike
England'3 NHS, which provides free treatment, Medicaid and Medi-
care only provide insurance, which maintains the fee-for-service pri-
vate market system and leaves many without regular health care.
Rather than attempting a comprehensive comparison of the
English and American medical systems, this Note compares how the
two health systems provide publicly funded medical care for those liv-
ing with HIV and AIDS. 5 By looking in depth at one specific area, we
can extract general principles that may inform American
policymaking.
Part I traces the development and current structure of AIDS care
under the English National Health Service. Part II outlines America's
eclectic government-funded AIDS health care coverage and the chal-
lenges it presents for HIV-positive individuals. Part III considers why
the health care systems are fundamentally different. It offers that
America's deeply rooted welfare, special interest, and federalism
debates make the United States unfertile ground for its own NHS.
Although an American NHS remains unlikely, this Note concludes
that the U.S. can learn several lessons about financing AIDS coverage
from England's example.
I. ENGLAND'S NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE AIND AIDS CARE
This Part walks through the general history of the NHS, begin-
ning with its revolutionary birth at the end of WWII. It then describes
the roots of English AIDS care in the early twentieth century venereal
disease clinics and concludes by looking at today's AIDS care under
the NHS.
A. General History of the NHS
After WWII, the English government became increasingly con-
cerned with the expensive and unfair system of mixed social and pri-
3 Although historically between 4% and 11% of United Kingdom residents have
carried private health insurance (mostly provided by employers), it has been to sup-
plement, rather than to replace, the government care on which all citizens rely. See
Michael Calnan, The NHS and Private Health Care, 10 HEALTH MATRIX 3, 5-6 (2000).
4 See infra note 120 and accompanying text.
5 Throughout this Note, "AIDS" and "HIV" are used interchangeably, referring
to both HIV and AIDS unless the context indicates otherwise.
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vate insurance that left approximately 50% of the population-largely
women, children, and the elderly-uncovered and provided unequal
care to those who were covered. 6 Not only were England's uninsured
cut off by social and financial barriers, they were geographically iso-
lated from medical care as well. Doctors clustered into wealthier com-
munities where patients could afford their services. 7
Filled with idealism, the newly elected, Labour-controlled Parlia-
ment passed the National Health Service Act of 1946,8 creating the
NHS, which began operating in 1948.9 In that year, Aneurin Bevan,
the new Minister of Health, famously promised that "'a dropped bed-
pan would resound through the corridors of Whitehall."' 10 The medi-
cal care was to be "comprehensive" both in that it would be available
to all people and that all necessary care, from family doctors to spe-
cialists, would be covered. 1
This comprehensive medical care was and continues to be
funded through central taxation. Since 1948, the English government
has repeatedly reviewed its central taxation model and concluded that
it is the best mode of funding.1 2 But universal health coverage has
continually proven more expensive than expected. As early as 1951,
overwhelmed by demand, the NHS was forced to charge patients for
prescription drugs and eyeglasses. 13 The Minister of Health consid-
ered the change a violation of the fundamental principles of the NHS
and immediately resigned. 14 As Christopher Newdick describes, "This
began a consistent story of providing exceptional service for the vic-
tims of accidents and emergencies; generally, a very good service for
6 ALISON TALBOT-SMITH & ALLYSON M. POLLOCK, THE NEW NHS 2 (2006).
7 ALLYSON M. POLLOCK, NHS PLC 129-30 (2004). Describing this inequality,
American Harry Eckstein observed that "[p]laces like Harrogate were gorged with
doctors while working-class areas nearby, in cities like Wakefield, Leeds, and Brad-
ford, were comparatively starved for them." HARRY ECKSTEIN, THE ENGLISH HEALTH
SERVICE 61 (1958), quoted in POLLOCK, supra, at 130.
8 9 & 10 Geo. 6, c. 81.
9 Christopher Newdick, Resource Allocation in the National Health Service, 23 AM.
J.L. & MED. 291, 291 (1997).
10 TALBOT-SMITH & POLLOCK, supra note 6, at 1.
11 Newdick, supra note 9, at 291-92.
12 See TALBOT-SMITH & POLLOCK, supra note 6, at 2 ("First, central taxation is
partly related to ability to pay. Second, it is cheaper to administer. Third, so long as
there is also no internal invoicing and billing for treatments, it separates clinical deci-
sion-making from funding, allowing doctors to focus on what is best for each patient
without any thought for the revenue they may represent. Fourth, and most funda-
mentally, it makes health care one of the things that binds society together, on the
principle that we all take care of each other when things go wrong.").
13 Newdick, supra note 9, at 292.
14 See id.
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patients in urgent need of care; but less consistent service for others
who often found themselves on long waiting lists."
15
Apart from the struggle of the NHS to fund comprehensive free
medical care, there was some success in the early years of equalizing
the access and service disparities. Between 1951 and 1958, under-
doctored areas in England and Wales decreased from 51% to 19%.16
This is credited, in large part, to the NHS Medical Practices Commit-
tee which prevented new practices from moving into over-doctored
areas. 
17
While the NHS grew and adapted, the earth beneath its feet was
moving. Demand for health care and the very definition of what it
means to be healthy rapidly shifted to a new paradigm. 18 Much of the
consequent increase in medical care has improved quality of living
and life expectancy, such that living well into retirement has become
the norm, and what previously went untreated can now be fixed with a
prescription.1 9 However, the tremendous increase in expectations
and demand for health services put stress on the NHS. Complaints of
long waits and inefficiency were already echoing in the corridors of
Whitehall and continue to be a hallmark of the NHS.
When Margaret Thatcher came into power in 1979, she began to
streamline what many had come to view as an inefficient bureaucracy
where funding did not necessarily follow quantity or quality of service.
Budgets and coverage began to be cut in the 1980s, 20 and nonclinical
services, such as laundry and catering, were outsourced. 21 In the
1990s, the Conservative government reformed the NHS to what was
15 Id.
16 POLLOCK, supra note 7, at 130.
17 Id. Equalization of service also improved from the early days of the NHS when
general practitioners in poor areas were working out of inadequate facilities and even
condemned buildings. See id. Financial incentives were given in the 1952 Danckwerts
High Court settlement and in the 1966 Family Doctors Charter that led general prac-
titioners to practice in partnerships and to build new facilities. See id. at 130-32
("From 1967 to 1977 no less than 700 publicly owned health centres were built, com-
pared with only 28 in the nineteen years from 1948 to 1967.").
18 See CHRISTOPHER NEWDICK, WHO SHOULD WE TREAT? 8-11 (2d ed. 2005). In
1951, soon after the creation of the NHS, there were only twenty-nine medical and
dental hospital staff persons per 100,000 where today there are 122 per 100,000. Id.
at 2. In 1951, United Kingdom health services treated 3.8 million inpatient cases, and
by 2000-2001 that figure had jumped to 14.3 million. Id. This massive increase in
medical care took place while the United Kingdom population increased by only
20%. Id.
19 See id. at 5-8.
20 POLLOCK, supra note 7, at 36-40.
21 See TALBOT-SMITH & POLLOCK, supra note 6, at 5.
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called an "internal market. ' 22 That is, while funding still flowed from
the central government, care was to be "purchased" from hospitals
and practitioners who would be rewarded for efficiently treating more
patients. 23 While the Labour Party complained about the privatizing
effect of the "internal market" before coming into power, Labour pol-
icy after 1997 actually continued the privatization of the NHS. 24
Despite contracting out many health care services, the British govern-
ment continues to bear the responsibility of universal health care.
The move toward privatization should not be mistaken as a shift
toward an American-style, mixed-coverage regime. Comprehensive
government-funded health care is a permanent fixture among British
entitlements.
B. The NHS and AIDS
The history of the care provided for HIV-positive individuals does
not begin with the creation of the NHS, but goes back further to pre-
WWII venereal disease clinics. While the debates and tumult of NHS
politics took place on the surface, venereal disease treatment centers
went about business without drawing much attention. The major
reforms that serve as landmarks in the NHS landscape, even the crea-
tion of the NHS itself, did not dramatically change day-to-day opera-
tions. Rather, the story of the clinics has been affected more by the
incidence of disease and the changing cultural attitudes toward sexu-
ally transmitted diseases.
Venereal disease treatment centers were established in England
in 1916 under four basic principles formulated by the Royal Commis-
sion on Venereal Diseases.25 Services were to be open access, free at
the point of service, confidential, and noncoercive. 26 With only a
brief lapse into coercive STD testing during WwI,27 these principles
have remained firmly in place through today's AIDS clinics.28 In some
senses, with open access and free service, early venereal disease prac-
tice was much like what the NHS would later become.
22 Id. at 6.
23 Id.
24 See id. at 6-11.
25 David Evans, Sexually Transmitted Disease Policy in the English National Health Ser-
vice, 1948-2000: Continuity and Social Change, in SEX, SIN AND SUFFERING 237, 238
(Roger Davidson & Lesley A. Hall eds., 2001).
26 Id.
27 Defence Regulation 33B required individuals identified by two or more
patients as a sexual contact to be diagnosed and treated. Id.
28 Id. at 238, 249.
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However, while the principles that ground today's liberal STD
treatment were present, the structure of local discretion in the use of
funds did not ensure adequate treatment of these unpopular diseases.
Central government provided 75% of the funding, but local govern-
ment had significant discretion in organizing the treatment centers.
29
Adequate training of medical personnel in STD treatment was lacking
and facilities were deficient, often confined to poorly ventilated base-
ments of hospitals. 30
STD treatment did not get much attention in English national
policy for much of the mid-twentieth century. The primary reason
was that demand for STD treatment was often low. There was a signif-
icant decline in STD incidence in the 1930s.31 And while the number
of men with newly diagnosed STDs peaked with war demobilization in
1946, use of penicillin enabled general practitioners to treat syphilis
and gonorrhea with little special expertise; these diseases diminished
quickly in the decade after the war.3 2
While STD treatment was hardly on the radar of policymakers as
the transition to the NHS took place, limited accounts show that STD
clinicians welcomed the change. 33 Meanwhile the growing pains felt
29 Id. at 238-39.
30 Id. at 239.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 239, 243.
33 For one, the position of both the STD medical practice and the venereologists
themselves were given a new level of legitimacy. One doctor later remarked:
With this transfer I think it is agreed that the status of the clinics and of the
doctors who served them improved beyond measure. From that date the
venereologist was given the opportunity of taking his place in the hospital
team on an equal footing with his colleagues in other specialties.
G.L.M. McElligott, Venereal Disease and the Public Health, 36 BRITISH J. VENEREAL Dis-
EASES 207, 211 (1960). In addition to joining the fold of the wider medical system,
funding of STD services was no longer provided through block grants to local authori-
ties who could neglect setting aside adequate funds for an unpopular practice area.
STD treatment was associated with groups suffering from discrimination. In 1950, VD
Medical Officer Robert Lees wrote in the British Journal of Venereal Diseases
The coloured men who spread venereal disease presented a very acute prob-
lem, especially in London and the large seaports. These persons came from
communities with a very high rate of venereal infection, and many arrived in
Great Britain already infected. They certainly had not the moral or social
training which would enable them to live as decent members of a civilized
society, and they were very badly assimilated in the community.
Robert Lees, V.D.-Some Random Reflections of a Venereologist, 26 BRrr. J. VENEREAL DIs-
EASES 157, 163 (1950). In addition to the white medical profession's concern about
being inundated with foreign and nonwhite STD patients, there was race-based fear of
black men spreading STDs to white women. See Evans, supra note 25, at 244-45.
STDs were also increasingly associated with homosexuality from the 1950s on. See id.
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by the young NHS did not impair STD medical service. Unlike the
larger medical market where services had suddenly become affordable
for the masses,34 STD services-which had long been free at the point
of service 35-were not flooded with new patients. And STD patients
were exempted from the prescription drug cost-sharing charges intro-
duced in the early 1950s.3 6
With the onset of the sexual revolution, the availability of the con-
traceptive pill, and the declining popularity of the condom in the
1960s and 70s, STDs surged and clinics began to burst at the seams. 37
But STD services did not significantly get the attention of policymak-
ers until AIDS came onto the scene in the 1980s. In 1981, the Lancet
reported the first English death from what would later be recognized
as AIDS.3 8 In the early 80s, even before a test for AIDS was developed
in 1985, activists from within the homosexual community and the STD
medical community were pushing AIDS onto the NHS agenda.3 9
From 1985, earmarked funds for AIDS treatment gave STD services a
huge shot in the arm, propelling the clinics to levels of quality and
prominence never seen before in the NHS.40
Like the creation of the NHS, the 1991 "internal market" reforms
did not significantly affect AIDS treatment. As a relatively small spe-
cialty where most areas had only one AIDS clinic to choose from, the
concept of a market did not transfer.41 But with a heavy emphasis
placed on efficiency, health authorities were not motivated to invest in
and improve costly and volatile AIDS treatment programs.42 However,
at 245-46. Funding control transferred to the Regional Hospital Boards and Boards
of Governors of Teaching Hospitals who had wide discretion in allocating spending.
This caused STD doctor salaries to rise and facilities to improve. Id. at 242.
34 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
35 See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
36 Evans, supra note 25, at 243.
37 Id. at 246.
38 Id. at 247.
39 Id. Meanwhile, a public debate raged over whether testing and notification
should be required for this new disease. Id. But by 1985, the liberal principles estab-
lished by the Royal Commission in 1916 had prevailed. It was reaffirmed that coercive
measures should not be adopted because they could drive AIDS patients away from
clinics, making the disease less detectable and possibly more lethal. See id.
40 See id. at 247-48. The 1992 Health of the Nation White Paper listed STDs and
HIV as one of five national health priority areas. Id. at 248.
41 See id.
42 See id. After 1993, earmarked funding for AIDS decreased, and the 1999 Sav-
ing Lives: Our Healthier Nation White Paper did not include AIDS or STDs among its
headings. See id.; DEP'T OF HEALTH, SAVING LIVES: OUR HEALTHIER NATION: EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY 3 (1999), available at http://www.dh.gov.uk/prodcConsum-dh/idcplg?ldc
Service=GET_FILE&dlD=28199&Rendition=Web.
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by 2001, there was renewed vigor for modernizing national STD and
HIV services with the publication of a new comprehensive strategy.43
The emphasis in recent years has been to increase testing and
surveillance, coordinate care, and educate the public on HIV and the
treatment services available. 44 These efforts have met with mixed
reviews. 45 There are two main concerns about HIV in England right
now. First, there has been a dramatic increase in HIV diagnoses since
the late 1990s.4 6 Second, there is a concern about access to care.
With diagnosis as a ticket to free HIV care, the discussion of access is
dramatically different from American debates about access, which
deal with availability of private insurance and public benefits. The
English access discussion is almost entirely about the amount of time a
patient must wait to be seen by a medical professional. English policy-
makers complain about the failure of genitor-urinary medicine
(GUM) clinics to see all patients within forty-eight hours of the time
that they first contact a clinic to schedule an appointment.47
43 See DEP'T OF HEALTH, THE NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR SEXUAL HEALTH AND HIV
(2001), available at http://www.dh.gov.uk/prod_consum-dh/idcplg?IdcService=GET
_FILE&dID=5539&Rendition=Web.
44 HEALTH PROT. AGENCY, A COMPLEX PicTuRE: HIV AND OTHER SEXUALLY TRANS-
MITTED INFECTIONS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM: 2006 § 2, at 13-29 (2006) [hereinafter
COMPLEX PICTURE], available at http://www.hpa.org.uk/publications/2006/hiv sti_
2006/pdf/a_complexPicture_2006_last.pdf.
45 See, e.g., TERRENCE HIGGINS TRUST, CREATING A PATIENT-LED SEXUAL HEALTH
SERVICE § 1, at 4 (2005), available at http://www.tht.org.uk/informationresources/
publications/policyreports/creatingapatientledsexualhealthservice.pdf ("England's
sexual health is currently characterised by poor access to services, high levels of HIV
and Sexually Transmitted Infection (STI) diagnoses, and high levels of teenage preg-
nancy." (footnote omitted)).
46 See id. § 3.1, at 5 (citing a "300% growth in the annual numbers of HIV diagno-
ses since 1996"); see also HEALTH PROT. AGENCY, Focus ON PREVENTION: HIV AND
OTHER SEXUALLY TRANSMITTED INFECTIONS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM IN 2003 § 3.2.1, at
10 (2004) [hereinafter Focus ON PREVENTION], available at http://www.hpa.org.uk/
publications/2004/focusonprevention/focusonprevention.pdf ("The large rise in
the number of new HIV diagnoses made in the UK each year since 1998 continued in
2003, so that the annual total of 6606 diagnoses was more than double the 2835 diag-
noses in 1998 .... ").
47 COMPLEX PICTURE, supra note 44, § 4.1, at 47-48; TERRENCE HIGGINS TRUST,
ACHIEVING THE 48 HOUR ACCESS TARGET § 1.2, at 1 (2005), available at http://www.t
ht.org.uk/informationresources/publications/policybriefingpapers/achieivin48hour
target.pdf ("Growing waiting times to access NHS Genito Urinary Medicine (GUM)
services have been a contributor to worsening sexual health. A review of appointment
waiting times undertaken by the Health Protection Agency (HPA) in 2004 showed
that only 18% of people with routine appointments and only 72% of emergency
appointments were seen by GUM services within 48 hours." (citing Focus ON PREVEN-
TION, supra note 46, § 6.6, at 63)). However, waiting times at English GUM clinics
1364 [VOL. 83:3
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The hub of AIDS treatment under the NHS is the GUM clinic. In
addition to medical checkups, 48 many clinics have auxiliary services,
such as pharmacies, dentists, dieticians, emergency walk-in doctors,
foot clinics, sexual health advisors, social workers, and sexual health
services where patients can obtain free and confidential STD tests
without an appointment.49
AIDS treatment is provided free at the point of service. The one
exception is for foreign nationals. There is no right to free service for
those who travel to the United Kingdom for the purpose of medical
treatment.50 There are several exceptions, however, which allow for-
eigners to obtain free NHS treatment. STD testing and out-patient
emergency services are free to everyone. 51 Broad categories of people
are exempt from NHS charges, including those employed in the
United Kingdom, permanent residents, those who have resided in the
United Kingdom for twelve months, refugees, asylum seekers, prison-
ers, immigration detainees, and full-time students. 52
have dramatically improved over the past few years to the point that 85% of patients
were offered appointments within 48 hours according to a comprehensive August
2007 audit. HEALTH PROT. AGENCY, WAITING TIMES FOR GENITOURINARY MEDICINE
CLINICS RESULTS FROM AUGUST 2007 AUDIT 4 (2007), available at http://
www.hpa.org.uk/infections/topics-az/hiv-and-sti/Stats/STIs/GUMWtimes/
default.htm (follow "Download August Audit Results" hyperlink).
48 A trip to the clinic typically begins with the patient seeing an HIV consultant
doctor. This may include an examination, discussion of tests, prescription of new
medications, or referral to specialists in areas other than HIV. After meeting with the
doctor, there are typically regular blood tests given by a nurse or phlebotomist. NAM,
Factsheet 107: Visiting Your HIV Clinic (Apr. 2006), http://www.aidsmap.com/files/
file1000880.pdf.
49 NAM, Factsheet 63: HIV Clinic Services (July 2005), http://www.aidsmap.
com/files/file1000836.pdf. In addition to GUM clinics, AIDS patients are
encouraged to see a general practitioner (GP) who can provide non-HIV health ser-
vices and prescribe a wider variety of medications. NAM, Factsheet 62: GPs & Primary
Care (July 2005), http://www.aidsmap.com/files/file1000835.pdf.
50 NAM, Factsheet 50: NHS & Non-UK Nationals (Jan. 2004), http://www.aids
map.com/files/file1000823.pdf. Before traveling to the United Kingdom, European
Economic Area (EEA) nationals must seek authorization from their home social
security institution, which is responsible for paying for the medical service. Id. The
EEA member states are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway,
Portugal, Spain, and Sweden. Id.
51 Id.
52 Id. By international agreement, medical treatment that becomes necessary
during travel to the United Kingdom is free for nationals of certain nations (Schedule
2 countries). Id. Schedule 2 countries are Anguilla, Australia, Barbados, British Vir-
gin Islands, Bulgaria, Channel Islands, Czech Republic, Falkland Islands, Gibraltar,
Hungary, Isle of Man, Malta, Montserrat, New Zealand, Poland, Romania, Russia and
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Being the only frontier of NHS eligibility, the coverage of foreign
nationals raises a heated debate among the British. Some argue that
asylum seekers and immigrants in the United Kingdom should receive
free HIV treatment to prevent the virus from spreading. 53 Others
complain that free treatment for aliens leads to "health tourists" and is
an unnecessary burden on the already stressed NHS.54
The English debate about treating foreign nationals resembles
American policy discussions in that they both ask the question of who
should be covered by limited governmental resources. But in all other
ways, the English question in treating HIV patients has been how to
treat those who are infected. The NHS, since its inception, and GUM
clinics, from their roots in the pre-WWII venereal disease clinics, have
struggled to deal with changing demand with limited resources, but
the question has consistently been how.
II. UNITED STATES AIDS CARE: MEDICAID, MEDICARE, ETC.
American government-funded health care for those living with
AIDS is markedly different from that of England. While the United
States medical safety net came as a response to many of the same
problems that spawned the NHS-quantitative and qualitative dispar-
ity in health coverage for the poor-the American political and social
climate produced a more compromised approach. The American
"system" is a patchwork of government programs (namely Medicaid,
Medicare, and the Ryan White Act), private insurance, and charity.
While there has been a significant improvement in AIDS coverage and
care since the 1980s,5 5 there remain many holes in coverage for the
poor and the nearly poor. Subpart A of this Part describes the history
of American government funding for AIDS care and its for-better-or-
former USSR states (excluding Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia), Slovak Republic, St.
Helena, Turks and Caicos Islands, and states of the former Yugoslavia (Serbia, Monte-
negro, Croatia, Bosnia, Slovenia, and Macedonia). Id. There are also reciprocal
agreements with several nations that allow patients to be referred to the NHS for
hospital care. Id. The countries with reciprocal agreements with the United King-
dom are Anguilla, Bosnia, British Virgin Islands, Channel Islands, Falkland Islands,
Gibraltar, Isle of Man, Macedonia, Malta, Montserrat, Montenegro, the Russian Fed-
eration, Serbia, Slovenia, St. Helena, and Turks and Caicos Islands. Id.
53 The Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., United Kingdom Should Provide Free
HIV/AIDS-Related Treatment to Immigrants, Asylum Seekers, Report Says (Mar. 22,
2005), http://www.kaisernetwork.org/daily-reports/rep-index.cfm?hint=l &DRID=
28844.
54 Id.
55 See JONATHAN ENGEL, POOR PEOPLE'S MEDICINE 233-35, 250 (2006) ("Over the
next several years [after 1990], education programs, greater acceptance of the use of
condoms, and better anti-retroviral drugs combined to stabilize the AIDS epidemic.").
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for-worse marriage to the welfare system. Subpart B outlines the tat-
tered medical safety net, individually analyzing the limitations of AIDS
coverage under the main three sources of government funded care:
Medicaid, Medicare, and the Ryan White Act.
A. History of Federal Government Funding for AIDS Care
As with the NHS, the American programs that now fund AIDS
care were born out of a concern for the contemporary inequities in
health care coverage.5 6 Further, as in England before the inception of
the NHS, the poor not only had a financial barrier to entry, they were
also geographically separated, living in poor neighborhoods that were
underserved by doctors and hospitals. 57
Whereas NHS HIV care has its historical roots in public STD clin-
ics, funding for American AIDS treatment stems from the welfare sys-
tem. An extension of Lyndon Johnson's War on Poverty, Medicare
and Medicaid began with the passage of the Social Security Act of
1965.58 Rather than replace the insurance and private medical service
system, Medicare and Medicaid supplemented and reinforced the pri-
vate distribution of health care. Medicare acts as federal insurance for
the elderly and disabled, while Medicaid is insurance for poor people
funded by the federal and state governments and administered by
states.
59
Medicare drew far more attention immediately-as well as more
criticism. 60 The strongest opposition to Medicare came from the
American Medical Association (AMA). Doctors initially feared that
the program would lead to national health insurance for everyone,
which they considered, in the words of an AMA statement, "needless,
56 In 1965, while over 80% of Americans between the age of thirty-five and sixty-
five were covered by medical insurance, 70% of children and only 63% of the elderly
were covered. Id. at 4. The disparities between the middle class and the poor were
even more pronounced. While nearly 40% of households with less than $5000 dollars
in annual income lacked hospital insurance, only 13% of households earning over
$5000 were not covered. Id. at 5. A startlingly low 22% of children in households
earning less then $3000 annually had hospital insurance. Id. Approximately one-fifth
of the American population lived in households earning less than $3000, the poverty
line set by the U.S. Department of Labor. Id.
57 Id. at 52.
58 See id. at 44-59.
59 See id. at 46-51. How Medicare and Medicaid function generally and for HIV
patients will be discussed in more detail later in Part lI.B. Medicare and Medicaid
perpetuated the private fee-for-service medical system in a way that was out of tune
with the rest of the community-oriented public programs of the Johnson administra-
tion's War on Poverty. ENGEL, supra note 55, at 55-61.
60 See id. at 49.
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wasteful, dangerous, and contrary to the established policy of gradual
Federal withdrawal from local public assistance programs." 61 The doc-
tors' concerns proved unjustified. Medicare did not lead to universal
national health insurance. And Medicare turned out to be good for
business, with generally higher reimbursement than private
insurance. 62
The Medicaid issue that drew the most vigorous debate was eligi-
bility level. Conservatives wanted a low threshold, excluding all but
the poorest, and Democrats wanted to expand coverage signifi-
cantly.63 A compromise set the original eligibility line at 133% of the
federal poverty level (FPL).64
While several generations of policymakers have since tried to
reform Medicaid into a more comprehensive system, those in search
of an American NHS and unwilling to compromise for less have failed
to overhaul Medicaid. 65 While federal spending has waxed and
waned, Medicaid has remained largely the same program it was at its
creation, with federally mandated minimum state participation
requirements and optional provisions that states may use to expand
coverage and benefits.
After the identification of AIDS in the early 1980s, the combina-
tion of the holes in Medicaid and Medicare coverage and the costs of
the new AIDS drugs6 6 proved devastating for both uncovered individu-
als and state and local governments attempting to respond to the
growing crisis. 67 Congress took action in 1990 by passing the Ryan
White Comprehensive AIDS Resources Emergency Act of 1990 ("Ryan
61 Id. at 47. It was the doctors' opposition to socialized medicine alongside con-
servative concerns about a big-spending federal government that pushed the Johnson
administration to compromise on its medical funding programs. Id.
62 Id. at 47.
63 Id. at 51.
64 Id. This figure was frustrating to the Johnson administration, because it meant
that in many states individuals ironically could qualify for welfare cash assistance but
not receive Medicaid coverage. Id.
65 See id. at 145-46 ("The lesson from history concerning health reform at both
the federal and state levels was that political leaders should ... provide [specific por-
tions of the population] with as much care as was politically realistic. Politicians who
had attempted to wholly remake the system, or mandate the provision of care to those
who already had access to care, had accomplished little.").
66 "[T]he very first FDA-approved AIDS drug, AZT, carried an initial price tag of
$10,000 a year." THE HENRYJ. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., FINANCING HIV/AIDS CARE 1
(2004) [hereinafter FINANCING HIV/AIDS CARE], available at http://www.kff.org/
hivaids/upload/Financing-HIV-AIDS-Care-A-Quilt-with-Many-Holes.pdf.
67 See ENGEL, supra note 55, at 234-35.
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White Act"),68 which gave emergency funding to municipal and state
agencies. 69 The next subpart describes how Medicaid, Medicare, and
the Ryan White Act form a patchwork quilt that doesn't quite cover.
B. Funding AIDS Care in the United States: Catch-22s
and Holes in the Safety Net
While combination antiretroviral therapy has greatly improved
the quality of life and life expectancy for those living with HIV and
receiving care, the financial burden is overwhelming. The average
annual cost for those getting treated has risen to approximately
$18,000 to $20,000 per individual (including medications and medical
services). 70 With an estimated 46% of people infected with HIV earn-
ing less than $10,000 per year and 63% unemployed, public funding
for care is essential for a large portion of the HIV-positive popula-
tion. 71 Even among those not living in poverty at the time of diagno-
sis, paying for HIV care can be financially devastating, 72 and the
symptoms of HIV and AIDS often make it difficult for individuals to
continue working. 73
The high cost and patchy safety net leave many without care.
"[A]n estimated 42% to 59% of the almost one million people living
with HIV/AIDS in the U.S. are not in regular care. ' 74 Of those receiv-
ing care, according to 1996 data, only 31% are covered by private
insurance. 75 This leaves over two-thirds of the infected population
receiving care dependent on publicly and charity-funded care. Medi-
caid and Medicare together cover 50% of the total population receiv-
ing care (44% under Medicaid, 19% under Medicare, and 12-13%
eligible for both).76 The remaining one-fifth is uninsured, left to rely
on the Ryan White Act and other safety net providers. 77
68 Pub. L. No. 101-381, 104 Stat. 576 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 42 U.S.C.).
69 42 U.S.C. § 300ff (2000); see ENGEL, supra note 55, at 234-35.
70 FINANCING HV/AIDS CARE, supra note 66, at 1.
71 Id. at 2.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 1. This figure includes the estimated one-third of those infected that do
not yet know they are HPV-positive. Id.
75 Id. at 2.
76 Id. at 2-3.
77 Id. at 2. Not surprisingly, the inequalities of these statistics increase when race
and gender are factored in. Minorities and women are more likely to depend on
Medicaid and less likely to have private insurance, and minorities are more likely to
be uninsured. Id. at 3. And what kind of coverage an individual has correlates with
the patient's success in treatment. HIV patients who are covered by Medicaid or are
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The effect of health care on personal finances and the quality of
care for a person living with HIV is largely determined by eligibility for
the three government-funded programs, which are described in the
next sections.
1. Medicaid
Medicaid is the largest source of federal funding for HIV/AIDS
care. 78 Medicaid matches state funds on the condition that states
meet certain minimum eligibility and care standards. 79 Beyond the
minimum standards, states can choose to provide more coverage.
These optional additional provisions create significant variability from
state to state and over time with each state's commitment contingent
on political support and limited state budgets.80
Generally, Medicaid eligibility is limited to a narrowly defined
group of poor people. The minimum mandatory federal eligibility
requirements ensure coverage for individuals who meet the Supple-
mental Security Income (SSI) standard and are aged, blind, or dis-
abled.81 The 2006 SSI standard was set at 74% of the federal poverty
level.8 2 In 2006, a disabled individual had to make less than $7252 to
qualify.8 3 In addition to a very low income requirement, the disability
standard can also be difficult to meet. Being HIV-positive alone does
not automatically make someone "disabled." Rather, for purposes of
SSI eligibility, individuals are disabled when they are unable "to do
any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determina-
ble physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in
death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous
period of not less than 12 months. '8 4 This creates a Catch-22 where
HIV treatment could prevent the individual from becoming disabled,
but the treatment will not be covered until the illness becomes
uninsured, as well as women and minority groups, fare worse than their privately
insured, white, and male counterparts. Id.
78 In 2006, 51% ($6.3 billion) of federal spending on AIDS came through Medi-
caid. The HenryJ. Kaiser Family Found., HIV/AIDS Policy Fact Sheet: Medicaid and
HIV/AIDS 1 (Oct. 2006), http://www.kff.org/hivaids/upload/7172-03.pdf. [herein-
after Medicaid and HIV/AIDS].
79 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396v (2000); 42 C.F.R. § 435.2-170 (2006). Since 1982,
all states participate. FINANCING HIV/AIDS CARE, supra note 66, at 6.
80 See FINANCING HIV/AIDS CARE, supra note 66, at 8-9.
81 42 C.F.R. § 435.120.
82 Medicaid and HIV/AIDS, supra note 78, at 1.
83 Id.
84 20 C.F.R. § 416.905(a) (2007); see FINANCING HIV/AIDS CARE, supra note 66, at
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debilitating.8 5 In addition to disability and income requirements, only
citizens may receive Medicaid coverage.8 6
The federal minimum standard is only the beginning of the story
with a number of A la carte options available to states.8 7 All states
provide wider income eligibility for pregnant women and mothers of
young children, but the level varies widely from 133% of FPL (in
twelve states) to 275% (in Minnesota).88 After pregnancy eligibility,
the most popular option is the medically needy program, which allows
those who do not meet the disability requirement to spend down to
the state's income requirement.8 9 This option is available in thirty-five
states;90 but again, the level to which one must spend down varies-
ranging from as low as 14% of FPL in Louisiana and up to 87% in
New York.9'
Even once an individual meets state eligibility requirements there
is some variation in the benefits that are provided. All states must
provide hospital care (inpatient and outpatient), physician visits,
home health care, long-term care, and lab and x-ray services.9 2 But
optional benefits include case management, dental service, prescrip-
tion drug coverage, clinic services, and hospice care.93 States have sig-
nificant flexibility in the way that these benefits are administered.
85 See Medicaid and HlV/AIDS, supra note 78, at 1.
86 See 42 C.F.R. § 435.406-07.
87 See id. § 435.201. The range of options that states engage in after the federal
minimum can either expand or restrict coverage. Even the federal minimum is sub-
ject to variation, with several states dipping lower than the 74% SSI level. See FINANC-
ING HIV/AIDS CARE, supra note 66, at 20-21 (listing five states with SSI eligibility
below 74% and the lowest, Illinois, at 41%).
88 FINANCING HIV/AIDS CARE, supra note 66, at 20-21.
89 Medicaid and HIV/AIDS, supra note 78, at 1.
90 Id.
91 See FINANCING HIV/AIDS CARE, supra note 66, at 20-21. In addition to varia-
tions of SSI levels, pregnancy eligibility, and medically needy programs, there are a
few other options that are only available in a handful of states. See id. at 7. These
include workers-with-disabilities provisions, limits on prescriptions per month, and
Section 1115 waivers. Section 1115 waivers attempt to mitigate the disability-require-
ment Catch-22, by allowing those with HIV who are not technically disabled to
become eligible if they satisfy the SSI level. See id. Very few states have been able to
implement this program, however, because Section 1115 waivers are federally
required to be budget neutral. Id.
92 Id. at 8-9; see 42 C.F.R. § 440.220.
93 Medicaid and HIV/AIDS, supra note 78, at 2; see 42 C.F.R. § 440.225. Prescrip-
tion drugs, the most important part of HIV care, are covered by all states. Medicaid
and HW/AIDS, supra note 78, at 2.
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Prescriptions, doctor visits, and the lengths of hospital stays may be
limited, and states may also impose co-pay requirements. 94
Medicaid is the most important program funding AIDS care, but
it has a number of challenges. First, there is the Catch-22 in the disa-
bility requirement that does not fund disability-preventing HIV treat-
ment until the disease has become debilitating. Second, the near-
poor, who can neither afford private insurance nor HIV treatment,
are not covered. The high price of HIV treatment combined with the
low income eligibility level causes a second Catch-22 where the work-
ing poor cannot afford to continue working and be treated for HIV.
Third, coverage varies widely from state to state, both in eligibility and
in the care provided to those that are eligible. And finally, because
Medicaid is a welfare program that is only available to the poor, the
stigma of poverty is added to individuals already infected with a stig-
matizing disease. The way out of these problems requires greater gov-
ernment funding to federally broaden coverage into the middle class
and to change the disability requirement to include those with early
diagnoses of HIV.
2. Medicare
Medicare is the second-largest source of federal spending on
AIDS care (26% of federal spending or $3.2 billion in 2006).95 Gener-
ally, Medicare is an assistance program for those over sixty-five years of
age. 96 But people living with HIV can also become eligible if they are
disabled and have earned enough work credits to receive Social Secur-
ity Disability Income (SSDI) (the number of credits required varies
according to age) .97 Like the Medicaid disability requirement, the
Medicare standard creates a Catch-22 where the therapies that can
prevent disability go uncovered until disability is established. 98 And
Medicare adds an additional barrier to eligibility that compounds the
Catch-22 with a waiting period before coverage begins. First, SSDI
benefits only begin after a five-month waiting period once disability is
established.99 Then there is a two-year waiting period from the time
94 Medicaid and H1V/AIDS, supra note 78, at 2.
95 The HenryJ. Kaiser Family Found., HIV/AIDS Policy Fact Sheet: Medicare and
HIV/AIDS 1 (Oct. 2006) [hercinafter Medicare and H1V/AIDS], available at http://
www.kff.org/hivaids/upload/7171-03.pdf. Medicare spending on HIV/AIDS repre-
sents approximately 1% of total Medicare spending. Id.
96 See 42 U.S.C. § 426(a) (2000).
97 See id. § 426(b); Medicare and HIV/AIDS, supra note 95, at 1.
98 See Medicare and HIV/AIDS, supra note 95, at 1; supra notes 84-85 and accom-
panying text.
99 42 U.S.C. § 423(a) (1) (E) (Supp. IV 2004).
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SSDI eligibility begins until an individual can receive Medicare cover-
age.100 This results in a twenty-nine month waiting period after disa-
bility has been established (bearing in mind that even HIV is not per
se disabling). In the early days of HIV treatment, this twenty-nine
month wait meant that many infected with AIDS died before even
becoming eligible for Medicare.' 0 '
Medicare benefits include many of the same services covered by
Medicaid. Medicare Part A provides inpatient hospital care, nursing
facilities, home health services, and hospice care. 1°2 Part B supple-
ments the Part A hospital insurance program by helping to pay for
doctor visits, outpatient hospital services, lab work, and medical sup-
plies. 103 Part C provides the services of private insurance networks
through government contracts with HMOs and PPOs. 10 4 Part D,
which went into effect at the beginning of 2006, provides prescription
drug coverage.10 5 Part D's multiple prescription plans cover all FDA-
approved antiretroviral treatments. 10 6 This is a significant improve-
ment for individuals who are not Medicaid eligible, because Medicare
formerly did not provide outpatient prescription drug coverage.10 7
One of the major difficulties for HIV-infected Medicare benefi-
ciaries is that it has significant cost-sharing requirements and no cap
on out-of-pocket spending.10 8 Part D, for example, requires the pay-
ment of a premium, deductible, and coinsurance. It then has the so-
called "doughnut hole," where beneficiaries who reach a certain
spending amount on prescription drugs ($2400 in 2007) pay 100% of
costs until they reach the catastrophic coverage level ($3850 in
2007).109 In addition to payment gaps, Medicare does not cover some
services that are important to those infected with HIV, including den-
tal and long-term care. 110
While Medicare does not share Medicaid's problem of state-to-
state variability, Medicare's challenges are at least as frustrating. Like
Medicaid, it has the disability Catch-22. Additionally, the twenty-nine
100 Id. § 426(b)(2)(A) (2000).
101 See FINANCING HIV/AIDS CARE, supra note 66, at 11.
102 42 U.S.C. § 1395d (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
103 Id. § 1395k (2000).
104 See id. § 1395w-22 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
105 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395w-102 (West Supp. 2007).
106 Medicare and HIV/AIDS, supra note 95, at 2.
107 See FINANCING HIV/AIDS CARE, supra note 66, at 8-9.
108 Medicare and H1V/AIDS, supra note 95, at 2.
109 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395w-102(b); The HenryJ. Kaiser Family Found., Medicare
Fact Sheet: The Medicare Prescription Drug Benefit 1 (Nov. 2006), available at http:/
/www.kff.org/medicare/upload/7044-05.pdf.
110 Medicare and HIV/AIDS, supra note 95, at 2.
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month waiting period makes care even more elusive for those seeking
early treatment. Finally, the cost-sharing requirements, as well as the
lack of long-term and dental care coverage, put significant financial
strain on HIV-positive individuals."'
3. The Ryan White Act
As a response to the substantial gaps in coverage for AIDS
patients under Medicaid and Medicare, Congress enacted the Ryan
White Comprehensive AIDS Resources Emergency Act of 1990.112
The Ryan White Act is the payer of last resort, paying for treatment for
those who are uninsured or underinsured and unable to pay for medi-
cal services without assistance." 3 At $2.1 billion in 2006, it is 17% and
the third-largest form of federal spending on AIDS care."14
The services available under the Ryan White Act are primarily
outpatient and support services, including clinic services, housing and
transportation services, prescription drugs, case management, home
health services, hospice care, dental care, and rehabilitation.11 5
Unlike Medicaid and Medicare, the Ryan White Act funds AIDS ser-
vice programs directly rather than insuring individuals.' 16 Like Medi-
caid, eligibility requirements vary by state, and the amount available in
each state does not always meet the need. l" 7
Since 1965, the American medical safety net has made significant
gains. The combination of Medicaid, Medicare, and the Ryan White
111 These gaps in coverage may be covered by Medicaid, the Ryan White Act, or
private insurance coverage. Id.
112 Pub. L. No. 101-381, 104 Stat. 576 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 300ff
to 300ff-90 (West 2003 & Supp. 2007)); see FINANCING HIV/AIDS CARE, supra note 66,
at 12.
113 FINANCING HIV/AIDS CARE, supra note 66, at 12
114 Medicaid and HIV/AIDS, supra note 78, at 1.
115 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 300ff-14.
116 See id.; FINANCING HIV/AIDS CARE, supra note 66, at 8-9, 12. The funds are
provided through block grants to states, municipalities, and nonprofit organizations,
which have wide discretion in their application. See id. This funding structure is remi-
niscent of early NHS STD services. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. Local
discretion recognizes the unique needs of different localities, but it also allows for
lack of uniformity in the care that is provided.
117 See FINANCING HIV/AIDS CARE, supra note 66, at 14. For example, the drugs
covered by state drug assistance programs range from 463 to as low as 18. Id. at 12.
Also, the need can deplete the designated funds more quickly in states where Medi-
caid coverage is less generous. Id. at 12, 14. Some states have waiting lists for drugs,
and prescription coverage (especially for treatment of opportunistic infections) is lim-
ited in many states. Id.; see The HenryJ. Kaiser Family Found., HIV/AIDS Policy Fact
Sheet: AIDS Drugs Assistance Programs (ADAPs) 2 (Mar. 2006), available at http://
www.kff.org/hivaids/upload/1584-07.pdf.
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Act has made it so that those who know they are HIV positive usually
have access to quality care. That said, as discussed above, several barri-
ers lie in the path of individuals with HIV and AIDS. First, disability
eligibility requirements put HIV patients in a Catch-22 where the ther-
apies that might prevent disability are not covered until disability is
established. Second, many low-income and middle-class people go
uncovered because their income exceeds the eligibility requirements.
The high cost of the essential antiretroviral treatments can be finan-
cially devastating, forcing the individual out of the workforce in order
to get coverage even while the HIV infection itself would not prevent
working. Third, government funding and services vary widely across
the nation. States have different budgets available and different politi-
cal philosophies about welfare health coverage. And even Ryan White
funds, which are meant to fill the cracks, are limited in coverage.
These challenges have led many American policymakers to look
across the Atlantic and to wonder why the United States cannot adopt
a health system similar to the NHS. The final Part will examine a
number of historical and political reasons why the United States is
different and why there are several barriers to the adoption of an
American NHS that perplex reformers.
III. WHY AMERICA Is DIFFERENT
The NHS and the American medical safety net are different for
people living with HIV. First, the NHS provides care that is free at the
point of service. American care is almost exclusively fee-for-service.
While American AIDS care bills are often reimbursed by insurance,
whether public or private, many times they are not. For those unable
to qualify for Medicaid or Medicare because they are unable to meet
disability, income, or SSDI requirements, the high cost of care is a
strong disincentive when considering early treatment. Those who are
under care without insurance and those who have insurance with
heavy cost-sharing requirements face stressful and often financially
devastating medical bills.
Second, health care coverage in the United States is connected to
work for most of the population, whether through employer-provided
insurance or through Medicare SSDI credits. Ironically, the opposite
is true of Medicaid, where leaving work may be the only way to get
health care coverage. English health care, on the other hand, comes
with citizenship (or less) regardless of employment.
Third, while both systems create what have been called two-tiered
health systems, they are two-tiered in different ways. In the United
Kingdom, the majority of the population is in the same boat. There
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may be long waits for certain nonemergency treatments, and the
range of options for treatment only extends as far as the national sys-
tem has allocated resources. Because of this, there is a small percent-
age of the wealthy who have chosen to supplement NHS care with
private insurance and private care. 118 In England the separate tier of
medical care belongs to the rich. By contrast, in the United States,
the separate tier of medicine is for the poor. While the American
middle class and rich share the resources provided by private HMOs
and PPOs, the poor and near-poor have historically been limited to a
"system, made of public hospitals, physicians with lesser or foreign
training, community and neighborhood health clinics, and discount
pharmacies and treatment centers." 119
Fourth, the NHS is a tax-funded single-payer system where service
providers are paid directly by the government. By contrast, American
AIDS care is a hodgepodge network of state and federal coverage pro-
vided mostly through public insurance that reimburses individual
patients when eligible. The NHS is not unique among the industrial-
ized world's health care systems. It is the American system that is
exceptional, remaining "the only industrialized nation in the world
which relies on the private sector to distribute health care, and health
insurance." 120
The purpose of this Note should not be mistaken for a rose-
colored snapshot of the National Health Service. Valid criticism of
the NHS abounds, ranging from its bureaucratic complexity and fail-
ure to provide personal treatment to patients12 1 to waiting lists for
nonemergency care. There is no intention here to dismiss these
problems. They are important, but this Note does not reach them
because they are questions of how patients who are being treated
should be treated. Perhaps American medicine has answers for these
questions, but that is for another discussion. Rather, this Note is con-
cerned with the question of who will receive publicly funded care. In
England, the answer is "everyone." In the United States, those who
receive publicly funded care are in a narrow group, and those who are
outside that class have the following options: find another way to pay
118 See supra note 3 and accompanying text. These individuals may get a private
hospital room or more immediate access to an elective service. See Heather Draper,
HP/and Insurance, in HEALTH CARE, ETHICS AND INSURANCE 101, 102 (Tom Sorell ed.,
1998).
119 ENGEL, supra note 55, at xiii.
120 Id. at xvii.
121 See generally SOPHIE PETIT-ZEMAN, DOCTOR, WHAT'S WRONG? 5-8, 43-49 (2005)
(providing a fictional account of failed interactions between NHS patients and
doctors).
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for care, go without care, or become part of the narrow group (either
by getting sicker or getting poorer). In the HIV/AIDS context, the
American answer to the who question is unsatisfactory. The next sub-
part looks at why the United States has been unable to answer
"everyone."
A. Foundations, Entrenchment, and Federalism: Why America Is Different
So the question remains, why is the United States exceptional?
Why not an American NHS? The following are three reasons why the
American health system has resisted NHS-style reforms and will proba-
bly continue to do so. Although an American NHS will likely never be
established, this Note concludes with several lessons that our presiden-
tial hopefuls and members of Congress can learn from England's
example.
1. Foundations: England's Roots in Universal Coverage and the
Problem of the American Welfare Debate
English AIDS care grew out of STD clinics that were open access
and free at the point of service. 122 American AIDS care, on the other
hand, originated from the national welfare system with eligibility lim-
ited to the poor and disabled. 123 This welfare health system was
merely an overlay on the private insurance fee-for-service regime. The
welfare health system was enacted in a time of social compassion for
marginalized groups, but political entrenchment and ideological dif-
ferences would require a compromise that stopped short of compre-
hensive care. The earlier NHS had developed out of the murky
political ether of post-war idealism. By 1965, when Lyndon Johnson
sought to reform health care, the revolutionary moments after the
Great Depression and WWII had passed.
Instead of an American national health service, publicly funded
health care would always be associated with the welfare debate. On
one side are those of the philosophy of Richard Nixon, who insisted
on the ethos of the American dream and self-sufficiency. In his view,
welfare "served little purpose but to morally enslave its recipients and
deny them dignity and self-respect." 124 Along with this sentiment is
the ambivalence that many Americans feel about paying for the health
care of others, who may be undeserving. On the other side are those
like President Johnson who saw poverty and lack of access to medical
122 See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
123 See supra Part II.A.
124 ENGEL, supra note 55, at 113.
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care as part of the nation's social responsibility. 125 Unlike health care
policy discussions in England where health care is assumed to be an
entitlement, the Medicaid debate is bogged down by American ambiv-
alence over welfare.
If American publicly funded health care could be divorced from
the welfare debate, some of the Medicaid dissenters might join the
ranks of supporters of socialized funding for medicine. For example,
while Nixon despised Medicaid and other welfare programs, he was
among the multiple Presidents who pushed for national insurance for
all Americans. 126 The difference for him was that he rejected any sys-
tem that singled out a group for special treatment. 127 For those who
are only opposed to Medicaid for the perverse incentives that it brings
(such as leaving work or choosing certain family structures in order to
receive coverage), socialized health care might become more attrac-
tive if removed from the welfare context.
The American welfare system-which attempts to level the play-
ing field by giving aid to the poor and disabled, but does so incom-
pletely and reluctantly-raises the question of whether the United
States' communal values are fundamentally different from those of
England. England's choice for a central-taxation, single-payer health
system in some sense binds the national community together. 128
Is this communal value absent in the United States? Is the com-
munity itself missing? It does not seem to be absent when we look at
other areas where the American public has committed to work
together. We have public schools which, even though not federally
administered, are open to all residents, rich and poor. Public educa-
tion is even extended to children of undocumented immigrants. 129
Similarly, social security benefits are nearly universal for the elderly, 13 0
and in all the current debate about reform, few argue that it should be
scrapped or that eligibility should be restricted. The American politi-
cal system evidently can support communal cooperation for services
the public considers fundamental.
But why are public education and social security any more funda-
mental than health care? None of these three are explicitly protected
by the United States Constitution. Education, social security, and
health care are all arguably necessary for liberty, the pursuit of happi-
ness, and participation in the political process. Why then is health not
125 See id. at 44-59.
126 Id. at 120.
127 See id.
128 See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
129 See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 227-30 (1982).
130 See 42 U.S.C. § 402(a) (2000).
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considered part of the common good? This seems to be a chicken or
egg question. Did English communal values make the NHS inevita-
ble, or did the NHS's legislated entitlement create the community?
That public involvement creates a communally oriented outlook
seems to fit the NHS story better. The insurance and health care dis-
parities before 1948 illustrate that England was not culturally married
to universal health care. Rather, it was the public involvement-
sprung out of a revolutionary moment and ingrained in societal
expectations over time-that firmly established health care as a public
good. This description matches the experience of social security in
the United States. Initiated as a response to the dark days of wide-
spread poverty among the nation's elderly during the Great Depres-
sion, President Roosevelt pushed through social security as part of his
New Deal reforms. While it met opposition early on, it is now a per-
manent entitlement in American society.
Health care, then, has failed to become an American public good
only because it missed its revolutionary moment. President Roosevelt
seriously considered a national health care program as part of his New
Deal programs, but he backed off because of strong AMA opposi-
tion.1 31 In the 1940s, Truman took up health care reform more
aggressively. His plan would have instituted national universal health
insurance. 132 But he too was met by the AMA, which viewed socialized
medicine as communist and a threat to the independence of the med-
ical community. 133 The onset of the Cold War solidified the national
fear of anything socialist and the Democrats lost control of Congress
in the 1946 election. 134 Had socialized health care not been marred
by the phobia of communism during the formative 1930s and 40s, it
might have debuted in force as a universal system rather than later
stumbling in as part of the compromise that is America's welfare
system.
2. Political Entrenchment
England was able to shake free from the vestiges of its mixed-
funding, private-insurance health system in the politically and socially
volatile time of reconstruction after the war. In the United States,
however, stakeholders had more time to establish themselves in the
political system. By 1965 and thereafter, labor unions had been able
to bargain for rather comfortable health benefits for their workers,
131 PAUL STARR, THE SocIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 280 (1982).
132 Id. at 281.
133 Id. at 282.
134 See id. at 284-86.
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and they were not eager to risk what they had gained in a reformed
health care system.13 5 "Progressive labor unions . . . refrained from
endorsing government-mandated insurance, as their employees found
the employer-provided insurance was usually more than adequate."
' 36
Likewise, doctors, medical associations, and insurance companies
had developed a very profitable private system and were wary of gov-
ernment interference.1 3 7 Beyond financial motives, the AMA had ide-
ological concerns about a heavy-handed government and a threat to
professional and scientific freedom. For the AMA, all federal health
care proposals were suspect, regardless of any pecuniary gains that its
members might be predicted to reap. Their suspicion was grounded
in the fear that any program could provide a stepping-stone to more
expansive government health care, perhaps a national health insur-
ance system along European (or Canadian) lines, or worse yet-a
national health system on the British model in which doctors surren-
dered their practices to the government. 138 Medicine under such a
system would ultimately prove more highly controlled and scientifi-
cally adulterated (so the belief went), not to mention impecunious.
For a profession peopled by proud stalwarts and independent entre-
preneurs, the idea was intolerable.1 39
Medical and insurance groups had and continue to have a power-
ful lobby in Washington and have succeeded in making the general
public suspicious of any systematic changes that are more than incre-
mental. From FDR to Clinton, they were the strongest political oppo-
nents of expanded governmental health coverage.1 40
Because of this strong opposition from special interest groups,
single-payer schemes have never been politically viable in the United
States even though several Presidents have been attracted to the
idea.141 The British-style medical system was seen as utopian and
politically unfeasible.I 42 The most progressive reformers have instead
sought national insurance plans.' 43 But even these have failed to get
fair consideration.
135 ENGEL, supra note 55, at xvii.
136 Id. at 30.
137 Id. at xvii; see supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
138 ENGEL, supra note 55, at 47.
139 Id. at 64.
140 Id. at 64, 229.
141 See, e.g., id. at 229 (noting that as governor of Arkansas, Bill Clinton "initially
toyed with a single-payer plan, dismissed it as politically unfeasible, and turned to a
classic pay-or-play scheme").
142 Id.
143 See id. at 229-32.
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Even the most cynical observer must recognize that special inter-
est opposition has more than mere financial agendas in mind (except-
ing the insurance industry, which is of course fighting for its very
existence). There is a fear of an overreaching national government
burned into the American psyche. Why does much of the American
populace trust the private sector more than the public? Or is it just a
preference of local control? This brings us to the third reason for
American exceptionalism.
3. Federalism
The most fundamental reason for American exceptionalism in its
health care system is federalism. Who should bear the responsibility
to provide health care: the states or the federal government? Those of
the new federalism school believe that it is part of the state's general
police powers. They say that state government is closer to the people
and so better suited to address unique geographical health chal-
lenges.14 4 States can be laboratories of democracy. 145 And they argue
that state control of health care is economically more efficient,
because states can compete both for providers and patients. 146
Those who argue for a stronger federal health care system, more
in line with the NHS, say that it is the national government's duty to
promote the general welfare. 147 They say that national citizenship
should correspond with cross-state consistency in health care cover-
age. 148 They believe that the federal government can do a better job
in redistributing tax revenue in the form of health services. The fed-
eral government can avoid the problem of cross-state competition,
which allows a race to the bottom among states pandering to the
wealthy and powerful, to the detriment of poor and marginalized
individuals. 149
Those on both sides of the federalism debate are seeking effi-
ciency, pragmatism, and populist outcomes. Both sides seek a better
delivery of health care, but their differing methods of arriving at that
result are rooted in fundamental beliefs that are as deep as the roots
of what makes American individuals socially conservative or liberal.
Who do we trust to deliver essential services? Should health care
144 John Holahan et al., Federalism and Health Policy: An Overview, in FEDERALISM
AND HEALTH POLICY 1, 5-6 (John Holahan et al. eds., 2003).
145 Id. at 6.
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 Id.
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opportunity be redistributed nationally, at the state level, or locally?
Should it be redistributed by the government, by charity, or at all?
A compromise results, with the federal government funding state
medical services and doing limited oversight. With the federal gov-
ernment passing the application on to the states and the states
strapped for cash with health care costs rising, neither level of govern-
ment takes on full responsibility for health care. Ideological differ-
ences determine what each policymaker believes the solution should
be in terms of placing more responsibility on the states or the federal
government. Pragmatically, especially in the context of the AIDS epi-
demic, the American compromise is unsatisfactory.
B. Lessons for America from NHS ABDS Coverage
The current United States health care compromise is the result of
the competing interests in the American welfare, special interest, and
federalism debates. The federal government provides limited funding
and limited oversight. The states oversee delivery of medical services
to those who are eligible. And American health care continues as a
private fee-for-service system with some inevitably falling through the
cracks.
While an American national health service is probably out of
reach, what can we learn from England's NHS about improving health
care equality by looking at HIV health care coverage? The following
are principles taken from the comparison above and are politically
possible changes to the American safety net for HIV patients.
1. The Poor Should Receive the Same Care as the Middle Class
Universal care is a better equalizer for marginalized groups than
selective welfare. The reason for this is that universal health care
groups the poor with the middle class in the ca.:e that they receive. It
does not in reality group everyone together, because the wealthy will
inevitably be able to purchase superior care and move to the front of
the line. This has been the case in England, where high-income indi-
viduals buy private insurance to supplement NHS care.' 50 But equaliz-
ing the medical care provided to the poor and the middle class
provides two significant solutions to problems plaguing Medicaid.
First, it removes the stigma of being a welfare recipient. 15 1 Second, it
ensures adequate medical care because of the political voice of the
middle class.
150 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
151 See supra Part II.B.1.
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Presently, the middle class is grouped with the rich in the United
States, to the extent that individuals are covered by employer-provided
health plans. This marginalizes the poor and near poor in regards to
medical choices.' 5 2 The solution, short of universal health care, is to
significantly increase the federal eligibility levels for Medicaid into the
middle class.
2. Stop Encouraging Unemployment
So long as health care is linked to economic indicators, such as
income and work, there will be Catch-22s and incentives that are con-
trary to the values of our society. Currently, individuals diagnosed
with HIV who are not covered by private insurance have the incentive
to leave work to meet the Medicaid income eligibility level. 153
Without considering reimbursement, English public medicine is
able to treat patients according to need rather than ability to pay for
service. Those in need of health care in the English system are not
discouraged from working while their health continues to permit
productivity.
The coverage gap and financial Catch-22 of Medicaid in the AIDS
context must be dealt with. And its solution is the same as suggested
above. Medicaid eligibility needs to be increased at least to the level
where leaving the workforce is not more financially beneficial than
staying.
3. Finance Early Treatment
Public health care for HIV-positive individuals and those infected
with other infectious diseases should seek to treat illness as soon as
possible. An HIV diagnosis in the United Kingdom is a ticket to free
and comprehensive care. 154 This allows HIV-positive individuals to
get care so they do not become disabled.
Americans facing an HIV diagnosis without adequate insurance
face a Catch-22 where they must get sick enough to get financial help
with medical care that could have prevented the sickness in the first
place. The Medicare twenty-nine month waiting period and the Medi-
caid requirement that recipients be unable to "engage in substantial
gainful activity" discourage early treatment and reward sickness.
The solution to this problem is narrower and cheaper than
increasing Medicaid eligibility. It is simply that Medicaid and Medi-
152 See supra text accompanying note 119.
153 See supra Part II.B..
154 See Draper, supra note 118, at 102.
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care should consider an HIV diagnosis per se disabling, and the
twenty-nine month Medicare waiting period could be disposed of for
HJV patients.
CONCLUSION
The historical foundation of current health care systems in the
United States and England are vastly different. The NHS was born in
a revolutionary moment; AIDS care in the United States has its roots
in a system created in a climate of compromise. Because of the long-
standing debates surrounding welfare, special interests, and federal-
ism, it is unlikely that America could mirror the NHS. But we can
learn from it. Increasing the federal eligibility levels into the middle
class and providing early care without discouraging productivity will
strengthen our health system in the area of HIV and possibly beyond.
